Minolta bizhub C300 Spezifikationen Seite 68

  • Herunterladen
  • Zu meinen Handbüchern hinzufügen
  • Drucken
  • Seite
    / 110
  • Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • LESEZEICHEN
  • Bewertet. / 5. Basierend auf Kundenbewertungen
Seitenansicht 67
bizhub C352 / bizhub C300 / ineo
+
351 / ineo
+
300
Control Software, Security Target
Copyright © 2006 KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., All Rights Reserved.
68 / 110
management which is necessary to maintain security such as the patch application, the
account management, and the access control for the user information management serve, so
that this condition is realized.
8.1.3. Sufficiency of Threats
The security objectives against threats are described as follows.
T.DISCARD-MFPLease return and disposal of MFP
This threat assumes the possibility of leaking information from HDD inside MFP collected
from the user.
O.OVERWRITE-ALL is that TOE offers the function to overwrite data for the deletion to all
area of HDD, so that the possibility of the threat is removed by executing this function before
MFP is collected.
Accordingly, this threat is countered sufficiently.
T.BRING-OUT-STORAGEUnauthorized taking out of HDD
This threat assumes the possibility that the image data in HDD leaks by being stolen from the
operational environment under MFP used or by installing the unauthorized HDD and taking
away with the data accumulated in it.
For the above, the possibility of the threat is removed because at least either of the following
two measures is selected by the administrator.
O.CRYPT-KEY generates the encryption key for TOE to encrypt data to be written in
HDD, and the encryption board encodes data by OE.CRYPT.
OE.LOCK-HDD doesn't permit to read data from any other MFP, as a function of the
HDD, but the MFP where this HDD is installed.
In the above-mentioned, when only is selected, danger of leaking exists by taking out the
another HDD without the function of having been secretly replaced. For the above,
because the validity of HDD installed by TOE is verified by O.CHECK-HDD, data is not
written in the HDD replaced secretly. The possibility of the threat is removed consequently.
Accordingly, this threat is countered sufficiently.
T.ACCESS-PRIVATE-BOXUnauthorized access to personal user box using user function
This threat assumes the possibility that an unauthorized operation is done by using the user
function for the personal user box which each user uses to store the image file.
O.REGISTERED-USER is assumed that only the user to whom TOE was registered is
permitted to use MFP installed TOE, furthermore, the operation of a personal user box and
the user box file in a personal user box is restricted only to the user who is the owner by
O.PRIVATE-BOX, so that the possibility of the threat is removed.
OE.FEED-BACK regulates to return the protected feedback for the entered password in the
user's authentication, and OE-N.SESSION also requires the log-off operation after the
operation ends, so that O.REGISTERED-USER and O.PRIVATE-BOX are supported
sufficiently.
Accordingly, this threat is countered sufficiently.
T.ACCESS-PUBLIC-BOXUnauthorized access to public user box using user function
Seitenansicht 67
1 2 ... 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 ... 109 110

Kommentare zu diesen Handbüchern

Keine Kommentare